THE Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, wants his country to play a more prominent part in the religious geopolitical arena, as Moscow expands on the African continent, and the fall of Bashar al-Assad has exposed the vulnerability of Christian populations in the Middle East. Mr Mitsotakis intends to achieve this by dispatching hundreds of priests across the Middle East, Turkey, and Africa, and doubling diplomatic efforts to protect Christians in Syria.
Numbers alone will not make much difference in the long run, especially not in Africa, where the Russian Church entices clerics with financial rewards. The decision in Athens is a political one that reflects a determination to preserve Greek Orthodox traditions and identity from attempts at Russification.
These conflicts for dominance in the Orthodox Churches point to a deeper concern: the dependence of some of the historic patriarchates on external authorities and the political agendas of leaders thousands of miles away.
Geopolitical rivalry in the Orthodox world has traditionally been dominated by two players — Moscow and the Ecumenical Patriarchate — and it reached a recent peak in 2018-19, when the Ecumenical Patriarch, Bartholomew of Constantinople, responded to the pleas of Ukrainians for an independent Church free from Moscow’s influence, by creating the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine.
This was a pivotal development, because it humiliated the Russian Orthodox Church, which fought hard to keep Ukrainian Orthodoxy under its control. This event and the Russian invasion of Ukraine are redefining the power dynamics in ecclesiastical politics and extending the geographical scope of their competition for influence.
There has been a noticeable rise in the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s engagement in the Baltic states, while the Russian Orthodox Church continues to undermine the Eastern Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria, held by the Greek-born Theodore II, in Africa. At the same time, the Russian Church is solidifying its influence in the Balkans.
NOW, Greece has decided to step in and fight Moscow’s expansionism by defending the historic and ancient patriarchates with the allocation of extra funds for more clergy positions across the Ecumenical Patriarchate (Turkey), the Patriarchate of Alexandria (Egypt), the Patriarchate of Jerusalem (Israel), and the Holy Monastery of Sinai (Egypt).
In November, the Greek government announced 600 salaried positions for clergy in these historic centres of Christianity. Athens, weighed down by financial difficulties, has struggled to dedicate sufficient resources to its church-related diplomacy. Because of this, the ancient patriarchates have traditionally suffered chronic underfunding and became more exposed to foreign involvement.
The announcement by the Greek officials comes with one caveat, though. The news does not necessarily mean that 600 new clergy will be appointed, as it also refers to current clergy positions that have been occupied, but have not, in practice, carried salaries, pension rights, or medical-care contributions for a long period.
Even with the increase of numbers, Russia’s much shorter presence in Africa is unlikely to be stopped from expanding by the recent news from Athens. Moscow already has about 250 priests covering 300 local communities in more than 30 African countries — a significant number, considering that the Russian exarchate in Africa was established only three years ago. In reality, however, this was a direct consequence of the Alexandrian Church’s recognition of Ukrainian autocephaly in 2019, which coincided with President Putin’s increased interest in deal-making with African leaders.
Despite numerous canonical decisions taken against the Russian Orthodox representatives in Africa, including the repeated unfrocking of the Russian exarchs sent by Moscow, this has had no influence on Patriarch Kirill, who continues to exploit anti-Western sentiment. The Russian Church is poaching clergy from the Patriarchate of Alexandria by offering better material conditions. Greek newspapers report that Moscow is providing a monthly stipend of up to $US1000, and, in some instances, diplomatic privileges, compared with the $US200 monthly stipends for the Alexandrian clergy.
To what extent Greece’s announcement will alleviate the chronic problems of the ancient patriarchates is uncertain. But, more to the point, it shows that Greece has taken the strategic decision to step up its game in the Orthodox world, and, in the past couple of months, it has proved that it means business.
GREECE has also shown leadership in Syria, which, under President Assad, was heavily reliant on Russian backing. As President Putin has been preoccupied in Ukraine, with no resources to spare for Syria, this created a vacuum, which was also felt in the religious sphere. Mr Mitsotakis was the first European leader to meet Patriarch John X of Antioch, immediately after the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham rebels took control of Damascus, and kept constant lines of communication open with the Patriarchate as the rebel group was advancing.
Greek efforts have been evident in Brussels, where Greece pushed for greater EU engagement in Syria, focusing on religious freedom and minority protection. At the December EU Council, the Greek Prime Minister drew attention to the situation of Greek Orthodox communities in Syria and Lebanon, calling Greece the “spiritual protector” of the Patriarchate of Antioch and the Greek Orthodox.
While Greece is challenging Moscow’s “Third Rome” ambitions, its revitalised efforts suggest, perhaps, a need for a long-overdue discussion about the dependency of the ancient patriarchates on outside centres. African Orthodox voices and their liturgical experiences are clearly not represented in this battle now being waged for souls by Athens and Moscow.
Dr Andreja Bogdanovski is a freelance journalist based in Edinburgh and Skopje, specialising in Orthodox affairs. He writes at divinediplomacy.substack.com.