| THE REPUTATION of the Church in the community should not take second place to the personal interests of a member of the clergy. This was especially true of one on whom a penalty was to be imposed for conduct unbecoming or inappropriate to the office and work of a clerk in holy orders, the Chancery Court of York ruled.
For this reason, it upheld a penalty imposed on the Revd David Charles King by the Bishop’s disciplinary tribunal for the diocese of York.
Mr King was ordained in 1978 and became the incumbent of the United Benefice of Middle Esk Moor in 2000. He had been married since 1978.
In October last year, the tribunal unanimously agreed that it was satisfied that Mr King had “pursued an improper, intimate and physical relationship with Mrs [Tracy] Byrne, which fell short of sexual intercourse, which began when they were both married to and living with their respective spouses”.
The tribunal stated that there was a risk, which it was in no position to evaluate, that the relationship had “prevented two marriages from continuing, with profound consequences for all the spouses and children” concerned. The penalty imposed by the tribunal was that Mr King “be prohibited from exercising any of the functions of his orders for a period of four years . . . and that he be removed forthwith from any office or preferment which he currently holds”.
Mr King appealed to the Chancery Court of York against the penalty. Under the Clergy Discipline Appeal Rules 2005, that court has power to confirm or set aside a penalty imposed by the tribunal, or to substitute a greater or lesser penalty.
The court, consisting of the Rt Worshipful Dr Sheila Cameron QC, Auditor of the Chancery Court of York, sitting with two members of the clergy and two lay people, heard the appeal on 10 March.
The court recognised that the proceedings constituted a personal tragedy for Mr King, in the light of his past service to the Church and his care of all those parishioners to whom he had ministered with diligence for many years. But that character evidence was only one factor to be taken into account in determining the appropriate penalty for his proven misconduct, the court said.
The court rejected the argument that, in determining the appropriate penalty, the tribunal should have taken into account that Mr King had been suspended from his duties as incumbent since February 2007. Although the notice of suspension prevented Mr King’s exercising the duties of his office, so that his parishes ceased to have the benefit of his ministry, his personal position in terms of stipend and housing remained as before.
The discretionary power of a bishop to suspend a priest or deacon during proceedings under the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 was a useful one, which could helpfully take the priest or deacon out of a stressful situation, thus affording him or her breathing space. Conversely, depending on the circumstances, it might be appropriate to use the power of suspension to alleviate a stressful or potentially stressful situation for members of the congregation where their priest was subject to disciplinary proceedings.
A penalty, in contrast, had the sole purpose of expressing the Church’s disapproval of the conduct of the priest or deacon by imposing a personal penalty for proven misconduct. Therefore the court did not consider that a period of suspension should be taken into account when a disciplinary tribunal or court was determining the appropriate penalty in a particular case.
It was also argued for Mr King that the penalty should be less than for adultery, as the tribunal made no finding that Mr King had committed adultery with Mrs Byrne, and that the sexual misconduct did not occur with a person for whom at the relevant time (between December 2004 and October 2006) Mr King had any pastoral responsibility.
Adultery is specifically mentioned in the Guidance on Penalties issued by the Clergy Discipline Commission in March 2006, and section 5 suggests that “removal from office and prohibition either for life or for a limited time are usually appropriate in cases of adultery.”
It did not follow, however, the court said, that sexual misconduct falling short of adultery should automatically attract a lesser penalty. Section 5 opened with the important words: “Sexual misconduct is usually a deliberate and damaging failure to comply with the high standards of Christian behaviour required of the clergy.”
The Guidance said that any penalty imposed should be in due proportion to the misconduct, and pointed out that, by virtue of their office, great trust was placed in the clergy by members of the church and by the wider community: “Clergy are expected to be worthy of this trust and are required to uphold Christian values in their pastoral ministry, in performing other duties, and in the conduct of their private lives.” That reflected Canon C26 which made it clear that “at all times he shall be diligent to frame and fashion his life . . . according to the doctrine of Christ.”
Against that background, the tribunal told Mr King when imposing the penalty upon him: “Your relationship with Mrs Byrne was plainly wrong, inappropriate and wholly inconsistent with your life and obligations as a priest in Holy Orders.” The court considered that that wording was entirely apt in the light of the tribunal’s findings of fact.
As to the suggestion that the sexual misconduct occurred at a time when Mr King did not have any pastoral responsibility for Mrs Byrne, the court did not consider that a relationship that started as a professional one could simply be compartmentalised to suit the member of the clergy.
On his own evidence, Mr King met Mrs Byrne in June 2001 at a funeral he was conducting for one of his parishioners who had been a resident at a care home for the elderly run by Mr and Mrs Byrne. Mrs Byrne subsequently attended his vicarage on two occasions for bereavement counselling; so he was clearly brought into a direct professional relationship with her.
No criticism could be made of Mr King for seeking to help her, the court said; but he should have been alert to the fact that, having seen her professionally at a vulnerable point in her life, he must be careful not to let the professional relationship with a married woman develop into a personal one.
Later, Mr King worked with Mrs Byrne. His relationship with her changed from that of a colleague to one in which he was behaving in an intimate manner towards her only weeks after she left her husband in December 2004. On his own admission, the relationship developed further during 2005, and they went out “for meals and drinks together as a twosome”.
The court said that, whatever the rights and wrongs within the Byrnes’ marriage, it was clear that Mrs Byrne was in a vulnerable state in December 2004, and it was inappropriate for Mr King to become emotionally involved with her. Although in 2005 they were both living apart from their spouses, they were still married, and the tribunal found that it “was an improper relationship for a priest to pursue”.
The court agreed, and added that it was not only improper in terms of his calling to “a high standard of moral behaviour” but was also a poor example for the community of how the clergy should conduct their lives.
It was pointed out for Mr King that the Guidance on Penalties suggested that suspension was a suitable penalty “where there is a realistic prospect that [a clergyman] with appropriate pastoral and other support could in the future resume normal duties of ministry”. The effect of a four-year prohibition would be to take Mr King to the age of 60, thus defeating that prospect.
The court said that, while it was a matter of profound sadness that Mr King should find himself subject to a penalty for misconduct at this stage in his life and in his ministry, the court had to mark the seriousness of the matter, whatever the age of the person concerned. Personal difficulties that might result from a penalty were not a test to what was an appropriate penalty, the court said.
The principle (stated by the Court of Appeal in relation to the suspension from practice of a solicitor) that the reputation of the profession was more important than the fortunes of any individual member, was also true of the clergy.
Depending upon the circumstances, however — in particular, the nature of the misconduct, and the degree of repentance — the age of the individual clergyman concerned might be a material factor (for example, youth and inexperience) in arriving at an appropriate penalty. That did not apply here, the court said.
Important mitigating factors in relation to a penalty were whether there had been “repentance, remorse, and willingness to learn from past errors”. The court was “surprised and disappointed” that, since the tribunal’s conclusion, Mr King had shown no repentance, remorse, or any change of heart. Repentance and forgiveness were basic Christian tenets, and due credit should always be given by a tribunal and an appellate court to genuine expressions of repentance and remorse, the court said, but regrettably there was no opportunity to do so in Mr King’s case.
It was argued for Mr King that a rebuke would be the appropriate penalty. The court did not consider that that would adequately reflect the serious nature of his misconduct, which was not outweighed by his long and much-appreciated service as a priest.
In the absence of any indication of remorse, there was no other mitigating factor that could be taken into account.
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